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ABSTRACT
This study was an attempt to assess the effect 
of Anxiety, Dogmatism and negative transfer on non-verbal 
paired-assodate learning. The theories of Spence and 
Rokeaoh suggested the following hypotheses :
I) In a new learning task, performance varies 
Inversely with Dogmatism.
II) In a negative transfer situation, performance 
varies Inversely with Dogmatism.
Ill) High and low dogmatic subjects do not differ In 
the time taken to reach the analytic stage.
IV) In a simple learning task, performance varies 
directly with Anxiety.
V) In a complex learning task, performance varies 
Inversely with Anxiety.
The experimental sample consisted of 60 Ss who 
were assigned to High, Medium and Low levels of Anxiety 
and Dogmatism according their scores on the Taylor Mani­
fest Anxiety Scale and Dogmatism Scale, respectively. Ss 
were selected In a manner which would discriminate the In­
dependent effects of Dogmatism and Anxiety on performance. 
All Ss were given a non-verbal palred-assoclate learning 
task. Halfway through the experiment the reinforced
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ill
associations were changed without notifying the Ss. The 
point at which Ss performed as If they realized that the 
programme changed was defined as the analytic stage, and 
a measure was taken of learning after this stage.
The results Indicated that performance In a 
negative transfer paradigm varies Inversely with Dogmatism 
(Hypothesis II); but that performance varies directly with 
Dogmatism In a new learning situation and directly with 
Plnxlety In a complex task (Hypotheses I and V). Hypothe­
sis III and IV were not confirmed by the data. These find­
ings were discussed In terms of the theories of Spence and 
Rokeach and a criticism was made of the experimental 
method and the theoretical formulations employed In this 
study.
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PREFACE
Within the confines of modern psychology, this study can be 
perceived as somewhat alien from traditional thinking. It is cei't- 
ain, however, that the two assumptions upon which this investigation 
is based are not alien from sound reason. One of these assumptions 
purposes that meaningful knowledge can be gained if psychology would 
focus on, rather than attempting to eliminate, the individual dif­
ferences which so frequently occur in laboratory experiments. It is 
only recently with Spence, Taylor, Eysenck, and Brengelmann that the 
orientation for psychological study has shifted way from the frequent 
denial of individual difference so characteristic of the 19th century 
school of V'/undt, The second assumption claims that relatively few 
dimensions of personality can explain a wide range of behaviour. 
Individual differences are fairly pervasive in their behavioral con­
comitants. This approach rests on the foundations set by Allport, 
Klein, Gardner and Holzman and is moving towards the molar concept­
ualization of personality already suggested by Rogers, Maslow and 
Schachtel.
It is impossible to construct a thesis of this nature without 
acknowledging the influence of those immediate persons who responded 
to the "idea" with such appropriateness.
The most serious expression of, gratitude must be delivered to 
Dr, B. Rourke whose non-directive guidance, personal interest and 
objective assessment of the topic made this investigation a worth­
while reality. In the same token appreciation is felt for the comments 
of Dr. A. Smith and Fr. Malley. To those people close to my heart and 
who received the absurd wrath of each frustration, I extend a well 
taught apology.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The present period in psychology is marked by an 
increased interest In the experimental assessment of the 
behavioral concomitants of "personality" variables. This 
Increased interest has brought the study of personality 
Into the empirical orientation of the laboratory. The 
reason for,and,the result of this experimental direction 
in "personality" research has been the productive applica­
tion of classical learning theory to the Interpretation of 
human behavior. In the main, learning theorists have at­
tempted to study the effects of motivation by controlling 
increments of motivation (e.g. drive levels) in the expe­
riment proper and/or correlating an Intrinsic measure of 
motivation (e.g. scores on paper and pencil questionnaires) 
with measures of performance. In the latter method, mea­
sures of manifest Anxiety have played an important role.
Chronic manifest Anxiety has been frequently 
described as a state of heightened emotionality, organis- 
mic unrest and psychological discomfort. This description 
of Anxiety satisfies the definition of drive as it is for­
mulated by Young (1961). It is an organic, a persistant
1
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2and an activating or energizing process. Taylor (1953) 
constructed a manifest Anxiety scale designed, in the main, 
to discriminate individual differences in the level of An­
xiety. Scores on this scale (Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale) have been correlated with individual performance in 
numerous classical and operant conditioning tasks (Taylor 
1956)* In general, the finding has been that performance 
in a simple task varies directly with levels of Anxiety.
In recent years several Investigators have cri­
ticized the learning approach for assuming that motiva­
tional variables or drive levels are the sole personal de­
terminant of individual differences in behavior. Restrict­
ing explanations to levels and types of drive is said to be 
a naive application of the principles evident in simple 
animal behavior. Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton and Spence 
(1959) suggest that the concept of motivation is limited in 
its application to all individual differences. To put the 
point simply, people with the same levels and types of 
drives often behave differently. Consequently, some in­
vestigators have suggested that there is a second variable, 
which, in conjunction with drive, determines behavior.
This second variable Is described as a cognitive style.
Gardner et al.(1959) have described a cognitive 
style or cognitive controls as invariant and pervasive 
structures which "provide instrumental means through which 
drive discharge takes place" and "modulate drive-dlsoharge
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3processes to accord with established modes of confronting 
reality contexts in which consummation is sought (p. 12)*" 
If an individual does have a cognitive style which has a 
relatively pervasive effect upon his behavior, it follows 
that these controls could determine individual performance 
in a learning task. Unfortunately, there have been rela­
tively few studies dealing with the effect of cognitive 
control on experimental learning. It is also evident that 
little effort has been made to verify the claim that cogni­
tive controls work in conjunction with drives.
One cognitive style which may affect performance 
in a learning task has been suggested by Rokeach (I960) in 
his description of the dogmatic or closed cognitive system, 
Rokeach (1954) defines Dogmatism as "(a) a relatively 
closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs 
about reality, (b) organized around a central set of be­
liefs and disbeliefs about authority which, in turn, (c) 
provide a framework for patterns of intolerance and quali­
fied tolerance for others (p. 195) #" No attempt will be 
made to review the extensive presentation of Rokeach’s 
cognitive theory or integrate it with that of Gardner et 
al. (1959). However, it should be pointed that Rokeaoh has 
applied the principle of cognitive control to the forraaticn 
and structure of a belief system.
One characteristic of the dogmatic or closed 
cognitive system or style is its relatively high resistance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to both change and the formation of new belief systems.
If Dogmatism is a relatively pervasive cognitive variable 
then dogmatic resistance to change should ramify in a 
large number of situation includlr experiments in learn­
ing. Briefly then, the 3 pose c his investigation is
to sho - hat dogmatic resistance change, affects learning
independently, in affiliati< Lth the -e Anxiety.
The plan of this chapter Is to describe the background of 
the concept of Dogmatism, to show its pervasiveness in a 
large number of situations, and to discuss the immediately 
relevant research concerning the effects of Dogmatism on 
learning.
Background
The for ulation of Dogrrtiam evolved primarily 
from the early investigations into the "Authoritarian 
Personality" (Adorno, Penkel-Brunswick, Else, Levinson & 
Sanford 1950). This research, arising out of nineteenth 
century thought ( Vinaeke 1963)* and the international con­
cern focused on anti-semitism, yielded a conception of the 
authoritarian personality, viz., an individual classically 
anti-democratic, ethnocentric, anti-semetic and politically 
conservative. The chief measuring instrument based on this 
descriptive foundation is the California P or Fascism 
Scale. This scale and its theoretical implications found 
a great deal of use in differentiating behavior in such
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5diverse areas as political attitudes, socioeconomic status, 
child rearing, conformity, psychopathology, etc. (Christie 
and Cook 1958)#
As this research expanded, the number and inten­
sity of the criticisms levelled against the P Scale as an 
adequate measure of authoritarianism increased (Christie 
and Cook 1958). Shils (1954) and Rokeach (1956) claim that 
the P Scale, because it is rooted primarily in fascist 
ideology, measures only Right or Conservative (politically) 
authoritarianism and is not a measure of general authori­
tarianism independent of ideological content. According 
to Rokeach (1956), it is possible for an authoritarian 
personality to express ideas consistent with any one point 
along the left-right political continuum. In this way, a 
communist may be as rigid and antidemocratic and voice as 
much ethnocentric prejudice as his conservative opposition.
What factors then distinguish the authoritarian 
personality? Rokeach (1954) states that the criterion of 
distinction lies in the consideration of an individual’s 
cognitive system. According to Rokeach, all cognitive sys­
tems are organized along a continuum defined by the two ex­
tremes, the belief system and the disbelief system. Belief- 
disbelief systems are said to be dogmatic or closed de­
pending on their further organization along three dimen­
sions, the belief-disbelief continuum, the central- 
peripheral dimension and the time-perspective dimension.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6For example, an authoritarian accepts the absolute correct­
ness of authority (central-peripheral dimension), and 
expresses a relatively narrow, future-oriented time per­
spective (time-perspective dimension).
In 1956 Rokeach published the first Dogmatism or 
D Scale which purported to test the cognitive structure 
associated with general authoritarianism independent of 
ideological content. Its items were designed expressly to 
tap the implications contained within each dimension of 
the belief-disbelief continuum. The D Scale, after several 
revisions (Rokeach I960) is finding support in the litera­
ture as a measure of general authoritarianism (Pruchter, 
Rokeach and Novak 1958; Rokeach 1956, I960; Rokeach & 
Pruchter 1956; Plant I960). Investigations by Adams and 
Vidulioh 1962, and others (Korn and Giddan 1964; Lefcourt 
1963; La Sciuto & Hartley 1963; Middleton 1964; Restle, 
Andrews & Rokeach 1964; Vidulioh, 1959; and Zagona, & 
Zurcher 1964) indicate that subjects high and low in dog­
matism behave in a manner consistent with Rokeach's 
theoretical foundations concerning all three dimensions of 
the belief-disbelief continuum.
Related Research
Rokeach, McGoveney and Denny (1955) designed a 
task, the "Joe Doodlebug" problem, to test the validity of 
the dimension of direct concern in the present investiga­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7tion - dogmatic resistance to change. Joe Doodlebug is not 
an ordinary bug and to solve the Doodlebug problem, sub­
jects must attribute to Joe three characteristics which are 
not typical of ordinary bugs as they are found in nature.
In other words, to solve the problem, subjects must abandon 
three beliefs and replace them with three new beliefs. The 
point at which subjects overcome the three old beliefs is 
said to be the analytic stage. The synthetic stage is said 
to occur when the individual integrates his three newly 
acquired beliefs to solve the problem. Subjects are en­
couraged to think out loud and the experimenter records 
the time taken for a subject to indicate verbally that he 
has overcome his old belief. This is the measure of anal­
ytic ability. Closed-minded subjects (as measured by the 
D Scale) were significantly slower than open-minded sub­
jects in the mean time required to solve the Doodlebug 
problem. High and low dogmatics differed primarily in 
synthetic ability but not in analytic ability. On the 
basis of this experiment, Rokeach (I960) states that the 
more closed a person’s belief system, as measured by Dog­
matism Scale, the more he will resist (consciously or un­
consciously) the formation of new belief systems.
According to Rokeach (I960), differences in the 
performance of high and low Dogmatism groups on the Doodle­
bug problem is attributable to differences in cognitive 
structure. Rokeach has stressed that Dogmatic behavior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8depends on the structure and not the content of a cogni­
tive system. However, Rokeach describes a hypothetical 
cognitive structure which is still anchored in a belief- 
disbelief system and which strongly reflects the early 
concepts of authoritarianism and the measurement of at­
titudes. The use of such a vague and undefined term as 
"belief" raises many questions related to the terras in­
clusiveness and relationship to non "Cognitive" knowing 
(e.g. neo-behaviorist concepts such as mediating responses). 
A review of the literature suggests that the D Scale taps 
a more pervasive variable than defined by the term "general 
authoritarianism". Recent studies also indicate that high 
and low Dogmatics differ in analytic as well as synthetic 
ability.
For example. La Scuito and Hartley (19&3) found 
that high and low Dogmatics differ in the binocular resolu­
tion of perceptual stimuli associated with the subject’s 
religious beliefs. Binocular resolution is primarily an 
analytic task. Mikol (1959) described predicted differ­
ences for closed-minded subjects in their acceptance of 
rejection of contemporary music. White and Alter (1965) 
demonstrated that open-minded subjects are more flexible 
in changing their judgments of weights. Perhaps the most 
demonstrative evidence that Dogmatism is a relatively per­
vasive variable comes from the research by Kaplan and 
Singer (1963). In their experiment they found the follow-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9Ing; (l) high and low dogmatics differ in analytic tasks 
related to sensory acuity; (2) a negative correlation 
exists between Dogmatism and sensory acuity; and, (3) dif­
ferences between high and low dogmatics are more prominent 
in autocentric sensation as opposed to allocentric sensa­
tion (Schachtel 1959). Kaplan and Singer (I963) concluded 
that "closed-mindedness and open-mindedness are not pheno­
mena which appear in some areas of an individual’s living 
and not others (p. 490)". Christensen (1964) found that 
synthetic and analytic measures of classroom learning (es­
say and objective tests) failed to differentiate open- and 
closed-minded students. Further doubt was cast on Rokeach’s 
interpretation of synthetic and analytic stages by Lyda and 
Pillenbaum (1964) who concluded from their work with the 
Doodlebug problem that "what had been attributed to indivi­
dual differences in the time taken to synthesize a set of 
new beliefs into a working system is more likely a conse­
quence of individual differences in the ability to utilize 
information given in a single unit (p. 102)". Prom the 
above research it is evident that (1) dogmatic behavior is 
manifested in more than just "situations involving person 
to person communication (Rokeach 1954 P* 196)", and that
(2) the results of recent investigations do not confirm 
Rokeach’s prediction that open- and closed-minded indivi­
duals do not differ in analytic ability.
Not only is the concept of Dogmatism too limited.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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but Rokeach's chief validating instrument, the Doodlebug 
problem can be criticized for being too specific. The 
problem does not support the general conclusion that dog­
matic individuals resist all change. The Doodlebug pro­
blem involves a special case of cognitive change. The new 
beliefs to be integrated into its solution are antagonis­
tic to beliefs about bugs which have been a positively re­
inforced part of an individual's cognitive system for a 
long time. If, as Rokeach claims, there is a strong moti­
vation for an individual to know and to understand, it 
does not follow that dogmatic individuals will invariably 
resist the formation of new beliefs, unless the new beliefs 
can be seen as threatening to the individual. It is also 
difficult to conceive that a new belief would be threaten­
ing unless it is antagonistic in some way to pre-existing 
beliefs which may have strong effectual loadings. At this 
point, the following question can be raised; are closed- 
minded persons relatively more resistant than open-minded 
persons to the formation of all new belief systems, or does 
this difference in resistance occur only when the new be­
liefs are antagonistic to pre-existing beliefs?
If, as it was stated earlier. Dogmatism is a more 
pervasive variable than was suggested by Rokeach (I960) it 
may be a variable which influences learning. If so, the 
above mentioned question can be recast in learning terms: 
are closed-minded individuals relatively more resistant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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than open-minded individuals to all new learning, or does 
this difference in resistance occur only in a negative 
transfer situation in which responses required of a new 
learning situation are interfered with by the responses of 
prior learning? The possible effects of Dogmatism on learn­
ing have not been adequately assessed either in a new learn­
ing situation or in a negative transfer paradigm.
Ehrlich (1961) and Christensen (1963) used the 
degree of classroom learning to measure the effects of 
Dogmatism on learning. Both investigators discovered that 
aptitude as measured by entrance exams is independent of 
Dogmatism but found contradictory results concerning the 
hypothesis that Dogmatism is inversely related to learning. 
Ehrlich (1961) concludes that "further study into the ge­
nerality of the Dogmatism-learning relationship seems war­
ranted (p. 149)". These studies draw criticisms for their 
quasi-experiraental approach and subsequent failure to con­
trol the momentous number of classroom variables that af­
fect both learning and Dogmatism (Vidulich & Kaimen 1961; 
Zagona & Zurcher 1964) *
Restle, Andrews and Rokeach (1964) confirmed the 
hypothesis that "the closed-minded person evaluates incom­
ing information as correct and important if it comes from 
a positive authority, and unimportant if it comes from a 
negative authority (p. 64-8)". These examiners found that 
high dogmatics (1) show superior performance when dapend-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ence on authority can facilitate learning and (2) are in­
ferior when reliance on stimulus cues encourages learning. 
There was no significant relation between transfer effects 
and high or low Dogmatism. Moore (1963), by verbally re­
inforcing the use of particular pronouns, discovered that 
low dogmatics were more easily conditioned and that there 
was no significant relation between performance and anxiety.
One study measured the differences between high 
and low dogmatic subjects in the learning of congruent and 
incongruent paired associates. Adams and Vidulich (1962) 
found the following: (1) all subjects made more errors in
learning incongruent associations (e.g. ball-square) than 
congruent associations (e.g. ball-round); (2) no relation­
ship was found between number of intrusions and Dogmatism;
(3) more errors were made by high dogmatics versus low 
dogmatics on incongruent associations; but, (I4.) high dog­
matics also made more errors on congruent associations.
These investigations, because they were not con­
cerned primarily with assessing the effects of Dogmatism 
on learning, failed to control the influence of authority 
and the meaningfullness of the learned materials. These 
studies compared only the high and low extremes of Dogmar 
tism as measured by the D Scale. A simple method of as­
sessing the influence of Dogmatism on learning would be to 
present High, Medium and Low Dogmatism groups with a non­
verbal paired-associate learning task. If, after several
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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trials, the correct responses to the same stimuli are 
changed, it constitutes a situation for assessing the ef­
fect of Dogmatism on learning in a negative transfer situ­
ation. This design is, in essence, a simple A-B, A-C, 
negative transfer paradigm. The second phase (Part II, 
A-C) requires the subjects to respond to familiar stimuli 
(a) by replacing the old response of Part I (B) with new 
responses (C). Because the stimuli are familiar, but the 
reinforced responses are different. Part II encourages 
intrusions and other forms of interference from Part I 
(that Is, negative transfer). In this study it will be 
assumed that the interference occurring in Part II is the 
result of negative transfer. This assumption is supported 
by the studies of Bruce (1933) and Osgood (194-9).
If Dogmatic individuals are resistant to all 
change, but more resistant when change is in direct op­
position to established behavior, the following hypotheses 
are forthcoming: In a new learning situation (Part I),
performance varies inversely with Dogmatism (Hypothesis I); 
In a negative transfer situation (Part II), performance 
varies inversely with Dogmatism (Hypothesis II).
In the Doodlebug problem Rokeach records, as a 
measure of analytic ability, the time taken for the subject 
to say that he has overcome a belief. Applying the concept 
of analytic ability to Part II (A-C) of the transfer para­
digm, a more objective measure can be made if the analytic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stage is defined as that point (that is, trial) at which 
the subject performs as if he realizes that the programme 
has been changed. It is hypothesized (Hypothesis III) 
that high and low dogmatic subjects do not differ in the 
time taken to reach the analytic stage.
The A-B, A-C, paradigm has been used to assess 
the influence of two other personality variables on learn­
ing, Rigidity and Anxiety. Their influence must be con­
trolled or accounted for in order to claim effects for the 
distinct variable Dogmatism.
The difficulty in assessing the influence of 
Rigidity in Dogmatism compares with the difficulty in de­
fining the term "Rigidity” (Goins 1962). One definition 
(Cervin, 19^7) of direct concern in the present study 
suggests that Rigidity occurs when stimuli evoke "mutually 
interfering generalized and specific responses (p. 628)". 
The second phase of a negative transfer paradigm is a situ­
ation in which stimuli evoke mutually competitive responses. 
It is in the second phase of a negative transfer paradigm 
that rigid subjects should be differentiated from non-rigid 
subjects. Polan (195^) found that there was no significant 
differences in paired-associate learning between rigid and 
non-rigid subjects in any phase of a negative or positive 
transfer paradigm. Polan used the Wesley Rigidity Scale 
as a measure of rigidity. This investigator also found no 
relationship between performance and Anxiety as measured
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953)*
Rokeach (i960) claims that dogmatic and rigid 
behavior are discriminable processes. Dogmatism refers to 
a resistance to change a complete network of beliefs; rigi­
dity, to a resistance to change single habits, not total 
belief systems. Using the Doodlebug problem, Rokeach (i960) 
supports a hypothesis that the differences between rigid 
and dogmatic subjects is apparent in analytic thinking. 
According to Rokeach (Rokeach, McGovenery & Denny 1955)» 
high and low dogmatics do not differ in analytic ability, 
whereas, rigid subjects do differ. As was reported ear­
lier, however, the concept of analysis and synthesis has 
not found conclusive support in the literature.
The Dogmatism Scale does not measure the narrow 
concent rigidity only. This statement is supported by two 
factorial studies (Rokeach & Pruchter, 1956; Fruchter, 
Rokeach & Novak, 1958) which have shown that items in the 
D Scale cluster separately from Rigidity items. The items 
on the Dogmatism Scale are said to test the individual’s 
ability to change a network of beliefs. Items on Rigidity 
Scales are concerned with individual tendencies to repeat 
simple habits.
Although Rigidity and Dogmatism are discriminable 
they are not totally independent. Correlations of .37 and 
.55 (Rokeach, I960) have been found between Rigidity and 
Dogmatism Scales. It must be remembered, however, that the
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Dogmatism. Scale is based on a well developed theoretical 
framework and purports to measure general authoritarianism 
along three dimensions within which rigidity is said to 
play a small part. The present study, rather than attempt­
ing to differentiate Dogmatism from rigidity, accepts that 
they are distinct processes in order to demonstrate that 
Dogmatism is discriminable from Anxiety and that Dogmatism 
influences learning.
There is some evidence that the D Scale may have 
a relationship to learning, not because individuals scor­
ing high on the scale are "dogmatic", but because they are 
high in a drive factor closely affiliated with Dogmatism, 
Rokeach (I960) suggests that a belief system is closed be­
cause it,defends against Anxiety, and that individuals who 
have relatively closed systems should manifest relatively 
more Anxiety than those with more open systems. Signifi­
cant positive correlations (Rokeach I960) in the range .36 
to ,6ij. were found between the Welch Anxiety Scale (Welch,
1952) (similar to the TMAS) and the Dogmatism Scale. It 
appears as if individuals high and low in Dogmatism are 
respectively high and low in Anxiety.
If Anxiety is a drive, then subjects high in 
Anxiety will leam in a manner which is consistent with the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, I908), According to 
Jones (1961), the Yerkes-Dodson Law can be stated as follows;
1. Efficiency of learning is a curvilinear
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function of drive strength, some intermediate level 
of drive being optimal.
2. Optimal drive strength is an inverse 
function of the difficulty of a learning task (p. I}.93)»
Applying this law to the A-B, A-C, transfer paradigm, per­
formance in Part I, because it is a relatively easy task, 
will be facilitated by the presence of Anxiety. Spence 
(1958) has made similar predictions. In experiments with 
serial and paired-associate learning, Spence (1958) found 
that if the subjects were not required to choose a correct 
response from a large number of competing responses. An­
xiety (measured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale) faci­
litating effect of Anxiety was a positive function of the 
number of learning trials. In light of this, Hypothesis 
IV was proposed as follows ; In a simple learning task, 
performance varies directly with Anxiety.
Part II of this paradigm (A-C), because it en­
courages interference from past learning, is, in Spence’s 
(1958) criterion, a complex or difficult task. Spence 
(1953) found that in complex verbal paired-associate learn­
ing, when an effort was made to maximize the number of com­
peting responses, high anxious subjects, as measured by the 
TMAS (Taylor 1953), were poorer in performance relative to 
low anxious subjects. These results are consistent with 
the Yerkes-Dodson effect and suggest the following hypo­
thesis, (Hypothesis V): performance varies inversely with
Anxiety in a complex learning task (Part II).
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The above stated hypothesis (Hypotheses IV and V) 
suggest that Anxiety, as well as Dogmatism, will influence 
learning in an A-B, A-C, transfer paradigm. In the present 
study an attempt was made to "partial out" the effects of 
Anxiety on learning in order to clarify the effects of 
Dogmatism. (This procedure is fully outlined in the Method 
section of this investigation.)
It will be recalled that Hypotheses I and II are 
based upon Rokeach's interpretation of the closed cognitive 
system. Related hypotheses concerning individual dif­
ferences in learning have been suggested by Eysenck (1952). 
No attempt will be made at this point to present a full and 
adequate view of his theory. Basically, Eysenck maintains 
that there are behavioral concomitants of the degree of 
cerebral excitation. Low levels of excitation ramify in 
behavior described as extroverted. The extrovert is said 
to form conditioned responses poorly and these responses 
once formed, extinguish readily. At the opposite end of 
the excitation-inhibition dimension of cortical activity 
is the introverted personality who conditions readily but 
whose responses take longer to extinguish. Eysenck and 
his affiliates have constructed the Maudsley Personality 
Inventory (Jensen 1958) which is designed, in part, to 
measure the extroversion-introversion dimension of per­
sonality. As an auxiliary investigation, this study will 
employ the MPI in order to assess its possible relationship
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with Anxiety and Dogmatism,
Purpose of Study
This investigation was an attempt to demonstrate 
that Dogmatism and Anxiety independently affected perform­
ance in a learning task. The learning task in this study 
was of the non-verbal paired-associate variety, using a 
modified negative transfer paradigm. Prom the theoretical 
framework of Taylor and Rokeach concerning manifest Anxiety 
and Dogmatism respectively, several specific hypothesis 
will be tested :
I) In a new learning situation (Part I), perform­
ance varies inversely with Dogmatism.
II) In a negative transfer situation (Part II), per­
formance varies inversely with Dogmatism.
Ill) High and low dogmatic subjects do not differ in 
time taken to reach the analytic stage.
IV) In a simple learning task (Part I), performance 
varies directly with Anxiety.
V) In a complex learning task (Part II) performance 
varies inversely with Anxiety.
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
The methodology and procedure chapter of this 
investigation can be divided into two main sections. 
Section I is concerned with the description and adminis­
tration of the paper and pencil questionnaires, and, their 
importance in the selection of subjects. Section II des­
cribes the apparatus and procedure of the learning task.
Section I
Subjects
Sixty-five male and female students attending 
introductory psychology classes at the University of Wind­
sor were employed in this study. These sixty-five Ss were 
selected from an initial pool of one hundred and forty- 
five students who were attending a scheduled psychology 
class. The only control imposed upon the selection of 
subjects was that they be naive as to the nature and pur­
pose of the testing materials.
Testing Materials
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) (Taylor,
1953)j the Dogmatism Scale, Form E (Rokeach I96O) and the
20
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Maudsley Personality Inventory (Jensen, 1958) were employed 
to measure the level of Anxiety, Dogmatism and Neuroticism 
and Extroversion, respectively.
The TMAS is composed of fifty items from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) purpor­
ted by experts to measure a state of chronic Anxiety. Ss 
admit to Anxiety symptoms by agreeing (answering true) or 
disagreeing (answering false) to each item. Items on the 
scale are mixed so that, according to the specificity of 
the test item, agreement or disagreement may indicate the 
presence of Anxiety, The range of possible scores is 0 to 
^0, with a high score on the TMAS indicative of high 
Anxiety.
The Dogmatism or D Scale is said to measure the 
degree of close-mindedness characteristic of an individual’s 
belief system. One dimension of a close-minded or dogmatic 
individual is his resistance to change. Ss express the 
direction and degree of close-mindedness by agreeing or 
disagreeing with an item at any one point along the six 
point continuum of a Likert scale (I agree very much, I 
agree pretty much, I agree a little, I disagree a little,
I disagree pretty much, I disagree very much). For each 
item, the degree of agreement represents the degree of 
Dogmatism. Although the D Scale is a forty item Likert 
scale, only the frequency of "agree" responses was used as 
the individual measure of Dogmatism. This method of scor­
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ing, according to Korn and Giddon (I96i|), controls for a 
possible extreme response set. Scoring the D Scale in 
this manner limits the range of scores to 0 to 1^ 0. The 
higher the score, the higher is said to be the level of 
Dogmatism. Several questions were included after the D 
Scale to test the naiveté of the subjects (see Appendix A).
As part of an auxiliary investigation, the
Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI) (Jensen 1958) was
also employed. The MPI consists of forty-eight one-sentence
items, twenty-four of which make up a Neuroticism scale,
while the other twenty-four items comprise an Extroversion 
»
scale. Neuroticism and Extroversion items are interspersed 
within the body of the questionnaire. The MPI is fully 
described by Eysenck (1958) and Jensen (1958). The Ss ad­
mit to neurotic or extroverted characteristics by answering 
"yes", "?", or "no" to each item. Like the TMAS, agreement 
or disagreement (yes or no) with an item may indicate 
Neuroticism or Extroversion according to the specific 
direction of that item. Agreement and disagreement indic­
ating Extroversion or Neuroticism are given a score of 2 
points; question marks a score of 1 point. This makes the 
range of possible scores 0 to Ij.8 for both scales. A high 
level of Neuroticism and Extroversion are indicated by high 
measures on the Neuroticism and Extroversion Scales 
respectively.
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Selection of Subjects 
The TMAS and D Scales were administered to li|.5 
first-year students during a normally scheduled psychology 
class. Prior to the administration of these tests, the Ss 
received the instructions found in Appendix B. Two Ss 
were discarded because of spoiled questionnaires.
In view of the high correlation frequently found 
between the TMAS and D Scales, it was necessary to control 
for the effects of Anxiety in the selection of Ss used in 
the learning procedure. Initially, the Ss in the original 
pool (N=lif3) were divided into High, Medium and Low Dogma­
tism groups according to scores on the D Scale; the range 
of Dogmatism scores for each one of these levels was 21 to 
lj.0, 17 to 20 and 1 to 16, respectively. Within each of 
these groups of Dogmatism, Ss were selected from the High, 
Medium and Low ranges of Anxiety scores; the range of TMAS 
scores for each one of these levels was 27 to 39, 12 to 26 
and 1 to 11, respectively. Referring to Table 1, this 
last division of Ss represented three levels of Anxiety 
within each of the three Dogmatism groups (I, II, III). 
These Ss were selected so that 1) High, Medium, and Low 
Dogmatism groups were not significantly different in Anxi­
ety as measured by the TMAS ( VI=V=IV), whereas 2) High, 
Medium, and Low levels of Anxiety were significantly dif­
ferent in TMAS measures within Dogmatism groups (III>II>I).
Approximately one month after the administration
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of the questionnaires, the Ss were contacted by telephone 
and a time was arranged in which they could come to the 
laboratory for the "learning" procedure in this investiga­
tion. Because of the relatively small pool of students 
available for drawing Ss to fit the above stated criterion, 
some levels of Anxiety and Dogmatism contained relatively 
few Ss. This fact, coupled with a frequent failure to co­
operate on the part of the Ss, further limited the number 
of Ss actually employed in the experimental procedure. The 
number of Ss for each level of Anxiety and Dogmatism, who 
participated in the learning part of this study are shown 
in Table 1. The total number of Ss was sixty-five (N=6^).
Table 1
Proposed Levels of Anxiety Within and 
Between Dogmatism Groups
Anxiety
L M H
L
TMAS 
Meas. 
N=10 N=9 N=4
IV
Dogmatism
N=7 N=4
V
H
N=4 N=10 N=7
VI
I II III
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Immediately preceding the learning task each Ss 
was given the MPI, The test and its instructions are 
presented in Appendix A. Instructions found in Appendix B 
were read to the Ss prior to administration.
Section II
Learning Apparatus
The learning apparatus used in this study was 
the General Learning Apparatus or GLA which is fully des­
cribed in the literature (Cervin, Smith and Kabisch 19&5)« 
Briefly, the GLA consists of six isolated panels arranged 
in a hexagon, and a master console located in a separate 
room from which all panels are automatically controlled.
All six panels were used in this study. On each individual 
panel there is a horizontal row of six white stimulus 
lights, a horizontal row of six response buttons and a 
green reinforcement light. These are the only parts of the 
panel used for this study. A diagrammatic representation 
of the panel is presented in Figure 1.
The GLA was programmed for 100# positive (green 
light) reinforcement in an operant conditioning mode. In 
this programme Ss respond to the illumination of one of six 
white lights (OS) by depressing one of six response buttons 
(OR). When a green light illuminates at the left of the 
panel (positive reinforcement) it indicates that the correct
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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response button has been depressed. The illumination of 
one white light constitutes a trial. More specific pro­
gramming is discussed in the "Procedure for Learning Task" 
section of this dissertation.
O  Green Reinf. Light
White Stimulus Lights
Response Buttons
Figure 1. The Elements of an Individual Subject 
Panel Employed in this Study.
An internal transistor type model AW (style 90M) 
Esterline-Argus Event Recorder automatically registered 
correct responses. A common door buzzer was also employed 
to notify Ss of test and training phases in the learning 
task (see procedure section). The operation of a standard 
General Electric window-type air conditioner was used to 
control temperature in the experimental room and mask any 
extraneous noise emmitted by the learning apparatus and/or 
environment.
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Procedure for Learning Task 
All Ss went through the following experimental 
procedure. In the instructions (fully presented in Appen­
dix C) the Ss were given the following information. They 
were told that each white light was electrically connected 
to a specific response button. Their task, they were in­
formed, was to learn which response button was electrically 
connected to each white light and to indicate (on the il­
lumination of a white light), their choice by firmly de­
pressing one of the six response buttons. The Ss were told 
that there were alternating test and training phases. In 
a training phase the Ss received a green light every time 
a subject depressed a correct response button (pushed that 
response button which is electrically connected to the il­
luminated white light). In the test phase Ss received no 
green light. The change from test phase to trial phase 
was signalled by two sounds of the buzzer; the transition 
from training phase to test phase was signalled by one 
sound of the buzzer. To acquaint the Ss with the learning 
apparatus all Ss were given a series of 12 white lights and 
told that the correct response buttons to depress were in 
a one to one relationship with the white lights (white 
light one connected to response button one, four to four 
etc.). During this tryout the Ss were given 100# green 
light reinforcement and the experimenter checked to see 
that all Ss were responding appropriately. The instruc-
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tions stressed that the programme of light-bufcton con­
nections would be different than a simple one to one rela­
tionship once the experiment proper began. Observations 
made during pilot studies indicate that there is no overt 
interference of this simple programme with the learning 
tasks which ensued.
The learning task proper was divided into two
parts.
Part I (A-B)
Ss were required to learn a programme of white 
stimulus light (A), response button connections (B).
Part II (A-G)
In Part II the programme was changed without Ss 
knowledge or, any break in the procedure. The sequence of 
white lights (A) remained as it was in Part I but the white 
light-response button connections were changed. This means 
that each Ss was forced to learn new responses (C) to 
familiar stimuli (A).
Part I and Part II consisted of nine test phases 
alternated with 8 training phases. Each part began and 
ended with a teat phase. Both test and training phases 
consisted of 12 trials each making the confined total of 
trials 126 jl2 (8+93 each of Part I and II respectively. 
The number of correct responses per block of 12 test trials 
was recorded as the measure of learning. The number of Ss 
in any one session varied from one to six.
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The sequence of white lights was determined by 
repeating a series of six blocks of randomly varied six 
white lights (36 trials is total). This means that for 
each of the six blocks of six white light presentations, a 
specific white light appeared once. Consequently for each 
block of 12 test or training trials a specific white light 
appeared twice. This randomization of stimulus sequence 
served to control for the possibility that Ss might memor­
ize the white light and/or response button sequence. One 
sequence of white lights was used for all experimental 
sessions. Programmes ware varied by changing the response 
connections. All programmes were of equal difficulty.
Each white light, for every experimental session, 
remained illuminated for 3*5 seconds whether or not Ss 
pushed the correct button. If a Ss in a training phase 
pushed a correct button with 3*5 seconds from the onset of 
the white light, the green reinforcement light illuminated 
immediately. Both white light and green lights extinguish­
ed 3*5 seconds after the onset of the white light.
The white light-response button associations were 
randomly determined for Part I of each session. However, 
the white light-response button connections in Part II were 
chosen so that five out of six connections, in Part I were 
changed for Part II, with one connection of Phase I being 
repeated in Part II. The white light-response button con­
nections were not randomized for Part II, because, if this
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were done, the number of connections in Part I repeated in 
Part II would have varied randomly between experimental 
sessions. This would have meant that some subjects would 
have received an easier programme in Part II than others. 
This would have confounded within-subject differences be­
tween Parts I and II, especially when the Ss were not as­
signed to experimental sessions at random. Each set of 
programmes was changed when it was possible for Ss, after 
experimentation, to inform other potential Ss of the con­
nections .
After the completion of each experimental ses­
sion, the Ss were told that the study was designed to as­
sess exactly what happens to the majority of people when a 
learning programme is changed. It was explained that 
future Ss must not know that the programme is to be chang­
ed. For this reason, the experimenter asked the Ss to 
refrain from discussing the study once they left the 
laboratory.
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CHAPTER III 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OP RESULTS
The most important aspect of the selection of Ss 
for the learning task was the attempt to control for Anxi­
ety, which has been frequently found to be significantly 
correlated with Dogmatism. The Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation computed for the TMAS and D Scale measures in 
this study was .35» This was for the initial classroom 
sample of 143* The standard deviations of TMAS and D Scale 
measures were 8.23 and 5*17» respectively. The correlation 
is somewhat lower than the mean correlation reported by 
Rokeach (I960 p. 348) between the D Scale scored as a 
Likert Scale and the Welch (1952) Anxiety Scale. The mean 
D Scale score for 143 Ss was 19*53 out of a possible 40* 
Korn and Giddan (1964), using a Stanford University sample 
of 195 and the same scoring procedure as was employed in 
this investigation, found D Scale means of 17 and for males 
and females, respectively.
Table 2 presents the Pearson product-moment 
correlations for Dogmatism, Anxiety, Extroversion and 
Neuroticism Scales. These correlations, it must be re­
called, refer to the restricted population of those Ss who
31
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participated in the learning task (N=6o) and who were 
selected according to TMAS and D Scale measures. The data 
contained in Table 2 indicate that, although the Dogmatism 
measure correlates significantly with the Anxiety measure 
(P<.0^), it does not correlate significantly with Extro­
version and Neuroticism measures.
Table 2
Correlations Between Questionnaire Measures 
for Ss selected according to Dogmatism and 
Anxiety Measures
(N=60)
Questionnaire
Anx. Ext. Neur.
Dog. .3é)-""«- .09 .12
Anx. -.41-"'"- .23**
Ext. -.41**
*:h:- P<.0^
The results of selecting Ss for the experimental 
learning task according to the criterion set to control 
for Anxiety are presented in Tables 3 and i|. Comparison 
of the two tables demonstrates that the mean TMAS scores 
for the High (18.07), Medium (18.^2) and Low (19.19) Dog­
matism levels are not significantly different, although, 
for each level of Dogmatism, D Scale scores are signifi-
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cantly different, although, for each level of Dogmatism,
D Scale scores are significantly different (Low 12.6?, 
Medium 18.62, High 24*74)« Comparison of Tables 3 and 4 
also indicates that the three levels of Anxiety are sig­
nificantly different in mean TMAS measures (Low 7.67, 
Medium 18.97, High 30.04) whereas the mean D Scale score 
is not significantly different for Anxiety levels (Low 
17.12, Medium 19.22, High 19.48).
Table 3
TMAS Score (Possible Range l-2o) for Anxiety and 
Dogmatism Levels (N=60)
Dogmatism
Anxiety Levels
Levels Low Med ium High Mean Total
Low
Medium
High
8.00
9*00
6.00
17*22
20.00
19.70
29.00
29.22
31.86
18.07
19.42
19.19
Mean Total 7.67 18.97 30.04
Table 4
D Scale Measures (Possible Range 
and Dogmatism Levels
1-40)
(N=60)
for Anxiety
Dogmatism
Levels Low
Anxiety Levels
Medium High Mean Total
Low
Med ium 
High
17*70
19*29
22.00
13*56
18.40
22.80
13*72
18.22
26.43
12.67
18.62
24*74
Mean Total 19.12 19.22 19*48
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The primary learning measure in this study con­
sisted of the number of correct responses made by each S 
on each test block. The means for each group of this mea­
sure are presented graphically in Figures 2, 3» k and $ in 
the form of learning curves for all levels of Anxiety and 
Dogmatism in Part I and Part II. The data on five subjects 
were discarded which reduced the total number of Ss to 60. 
These five Ss failed to follow instructions and/or co­
operate during the experiment. Inspection of Figures 2,
3, JI4. and 5 suggests that High Dogmatic and Anxious Ss tend 
to perform better than Low Dogmatic and Anxious Ss, res­
pectively, Ss also seem to perform better in Part II in 
comparison to Part I. The figures also illustrate the 
progressive increase in learning with each test block.
In order to assess the statistical significance 
of some of these differences, the mean total number of 
correct responses over all test blocks was computed for 
each group in Part I and Part II. These computations are 
presented in Table 5» and, in summary form, in Figure 6.
A three way analysis of variance for repeated 
measures and unequal cells was computed on the total num­
ber of correct responses over all test blocks. The summary 
of this analysis is presented in Table 6. Considering 
first between subject differences combines the performance 
measures in Part I with Part II, it appears as if the levels 
of Dogmatism had no significant independent effect on
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performance. Levels of Anxiety, however, affected per­
formance at the .01 degree of confidence. In general the 
High Anxious groups performed significantly better than 
Low Anxious groups. There was no significant interaction 
of Anxiety with Dogmatism although the F ratio for this 
interaction approached significance at the .10 level of 
confidence |Pj_Q(ij.,171) = 1.97[].
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance on the Total Number of Correct 
Responses in all Test Blocks for each Level of 
Anxiety and Dogmatism in Part I and II
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
■ df Mean
Squares
F Ratio
Between Ss
D (Dogmatism) 277.93 2 288.97 2.22
A (Anxiety) 2,009.02 2 1,004.21 7.82<H%
DxA 1,000.42 4 220.11 1.92
Ss within groups 21,944.71 171 128.33
Within Ss
Pt. (Part) 272.82 1 272.82 4.47-"-*
DxPt. 17.11 2 8.26 .14
AxPt. 602.72 2 301.38 4.94^HH>
DxAxPt. 1,901.82 4 472.46 7.79<Hw
Pt.xSs within groups 10,438.22 171 61.04
Pc,01 
Pc.05
In considering the effect of Part I and II, it 
appears as if the overall effect of changing programmes 
was to increase the total number of correct responses 
(Pc,05). This is clearly illustrated in Figure 6 which 
demonstrates that for each level of Dogmatism and Anxiety 
performance was superior in Part II compared to Part I.
The data contained in Table 6 indicate that there 
is no significant interaction of Dogmatism with the change 
of programmes. This is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows 
that the difference in performance between Part I and Part 
II is virtually constant for all levels of Dogmatism. The
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levels of Anxiety, however, significantly interacted with 
programme change (Pc.01). This is demonstrated in Figure
6. The difference between Part I and Part II in the per­
formance of High Anxious Ss is significantly different from 
the difference between Part I and II for low Anxious Ss. 
Contrary to Hypothesis II, this difference is in the di­
rection of improved performance.
The findings presented in Table 6 also indicate 
a significant interaction (Pc.01) between Dogmatism,
Anxiety and the change of programmes. In order to "break 
down" this interaction, an analysis of variance for simple 
effects was computed. Some of these computations are pre­
sented in Table ?•
Only at the highest level of Anxiety (Pt at A^)
was there a significant increase in performance as a result
of changing programmes (Pc.Ol). This is well illustrated 
in Figure 6. Inspection of the data contained in Table 7 
indicates that the tendency of performance to improve with 
an increase in Anxiety level was only significant (Pc.01) 
in Part II (A at Pt2) and not in Part I (A at Pt^).
The observation (Table 6) that the overall inter­
action between Anxiety and Dogmatism approached signifi­
cance is in some ways explained by an inspection of Table
7. It appears as if Anxiety significantly (Pc.Ol) inter­
acts with Dogmatism to improve performance in Part I
(DA at Pt^) but not in Part II (DA at Ptg).
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Table 7
Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects of Anxiety, 
Dogmatism and Parts I and II on Performance
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Squares
P Ratio
A at Dx (Anxiety at 
Low Dogmatism) .
A at Dp 
A at d2 
Error
914.43
2,011.24
83.42
2
2
2
171
427.27
1,002.62
41.73
128.33
3.26**
7.84***
.33
Pt at A]_ (Part* at 
Low Anxiety)
Pt at Ap 
Pt at Ah 
Error
2.49
.47
867.82
1
1
1
171
2.49
.47
867.82
61.04
.09
C.Ol
14.21***
A at Pt-i (Anxiety at 
Part I)
A at Pt£
390.46
2,221.24
2
2
192.23
1,110.62
2.06 
11.73'*
DA at Ptx (Anxiety 
X  Dogmatism at 
Part I)
DA at Ptg
2,702.30
196.22
4
4
676.33
49.06
7.14*-*-:'
.22
Pooled Error 171 94.69
Pc.Ol 
?c.02 
* P^ j.lO
In summary, it appears as if neither increasing 
levels of Anxiety or Dogmatism independently significantly 
influenced performance in Part I. However, the effect of 
simultaneously raising the levels of Dogmatism and Anxiety 
in Part I, was to significantly improve performance. In
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Part II, after changing the programme. Dogmatism neither 
independently nor with Anxiety significantly affected per­
formance despite the fact that performance in Part II in­
creased with the level of Anxiety. Changing the program­
mes affected the interaction between Anxiety and Dogmatism.
This failure of. Anxiety to interact with Dogma­
tism in Part I but not in Part II suggested an inspection 
of the raw data to determine if the change of programmes 
affected dogmatic Ss differently than anxious Ss, and, in 
a way which was not indicated by the learning measure.
It will be recalled that the programme was 
changed without the subject's knowledge. This means that 
Ss, before efficient learning can occur, must first realize 
that the programme has been changed, and, secondly, Ss 
must be able to abandon the old responses of Part I to 
learn the new ones of Part II. Rokeach (I960) termed that 
point at which the individual realizes that his belief 
system is inappropriate for the task at hand, the analytic 
stage. In many ways the analytic stage of thinking is 
analogous to the Ss realization that the programme has been 
changed. Consequently, that point at which the Ss realize 
the programme change will be referred to as the analytic 
stage. If levels of Anxiety and Dogmatism differ in the 
time taken to reach the analytic stage, the performance 
summaries presented in Tables 6 and 7 are confounded by 
this artifact. It follows that Ss who realize relatively
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early that the programme has been changed will have more 
trials to improve their performance.
In order to investigate possible within-and 
between-group differences in the time —  that is, number 
of test blocks —  taken to reach the analytic stage an em­
pirical criterion was set to make this measure possible. 
Although this criterion does not reveal when it is that 
the individual's cognitive processes come to the realiza­
tion of the programme change, it does set a standard which 
indicates at what test block the Ss perform as if they 
realized that the programme has changed.
This criterion was set as follows : That test
block at which the subject first pushes three or more cor­
rect responses was used as a measure of the analytic stage 
if: A) the subject pushed three or more correct responses
in the following test block and B) the subject pushed 
three or more correct responses in any test block following 
the first and second test blocks containing three or more 
correct responses. It will be recalled that one white 
light-response button connection remained the same in Part 
II as Part I and that each white light-response button 
connection appears twice in every block of 12 test trials. 
It was for this reason that the criterion for the analytic 
stage was set at three correct responses. Setting three 
as the criterion rules out the possibility that the Ss are 
just responding in Part II with the connection learned in
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Part I. "A" and "B" conditions of the criterion cited above 
were designed to rule out the possibility that the Ss pushed 
three correct responses by chance.
If comparisons are made between Ss in Part II, it is 
necessary to show that these differences are not confounded by 
pre-existing differences in Part I. For this reason, the above 
mentioned criterion was imposed on Part I learning in order to 
clarify the possible effects of changing programmes on Anxiety 
and Dogmatism groups. For the convenience of explanation, this 
measure will also be referred to as the analytic stage in Part I, 
although it must be remembered that it is not a measure of real­
ization of a programme change. In this sense, reference to the 
analytic stage in Part I is really a non-theoretical reference 
to the empirical criterion established above.
Table B is a presentation of the mean number of test 
blocks to reach the analytic stage for levels of Dogmatism and 
Anxiety in Part I and Part II. A summary of this table is 
presented graphically in Figure 7. An analysis of variance for 
repeated measures and unequal cells was computed in order to 
assess the statistical significance of between and within group 
differences. The summary of this analysis is presented in Table 9.
Considering first the between group differences which 
combines the effect of Part I and Part II, the data contained in 
Table 9 indicate that the levels of Dogmatism had a significant 
effect (P <.01) on the number of test blocks taken to reach the 
analytic stage.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
HT
H
H w
g
-CO
VJ1
füO
-O
o
S’
yc+
• #
f -  M n o >
O  O ^ p
X
H'
f -  VjJ S  p  M
• » P  ct O
O  ro PL % 3:
O  M
tr*
p
fO VaJ K  <
H" P
vn O Oh M
o  o y  w
Mo Mn
# # t-> >
oa H o a
O N  f - s: X
H-
QCL
XH*
(D
<:
(D
H
O)
ïï'
p.
H'
a
M O f - >
• • O aro
M n
oo 3: p
w M o s ct» fo VJ H*
o p. Oh
o o *
y
<
pr
M M o sc p
H- H
CO.
ON
M
M O
W
Iet
H*
m
a
y
É
H
M
y
a
a
1 ,
P'
o 1Hj cr
p
>  a
a
X o
H- tt)
P
Ct (-3
S p
m
a ct
a
P  CO
M
a  o
o o
Oh tv
3 w
a
ct ct
H- o
M
3 ap
H- a
a o
a*
33
a ct
a prct P
M
a
a a
a  'H-*
pm h
ct
M  H"
H  O
u>
S  ct
1 a
CNTh
O  P
H)
O
a
p
p
H
W
•-a
>
txi
f
w
cg.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ii-8
A Nawitian-Keuls procedure was used to assess the signifi­
cance of differences between group means. This procedure 
indicated that the only significant ( difference 
lay between the High Dogmatic Group and the Medium Dog­
matic Group. In general. High Dogmatic Ss reached the 
criterion of three correct responses for one test block 
(analytic stage) significantly sooner than the Medium 
Dogmatic Group.
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Figure 7» Number of Test Blocks to 
reach Analytic Stage for all Levels of Dogmatism 
and Anxiety in Part I and II (N=60).
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Test Blocks 
required for Subjects at the three Levels of Dogmatism 
and Anxiety to reach the Analytic Stage in Part I and
Part II (N=60)
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Squares
F Ratio
Between Ss
D 16.33 2 8.18 2.68***
A 39.34 2 19.77 13.73<:-:>"
DxA 10.04 4 2.51 1.74
Ss within groups 247.08 171 1.44
Within Ss
Pt 4.13 1 4 .13 3.9 9
DxPt 9.23 2 4.62 4.44''*''’'^’'
AxPt .93 2 .47 .43 .
DxAxPt 
PtxSs within
3.84 4 1.46 1.40
groups 177.74 171 1.04
i i i 'H ' f P<. 01
The overall effect of Anxiety on the number of
test trials to reach three or more correct responses in
one test block was significant at .01 level of confidence. 
Increasing the level of Anxiety appears to have decreased 
the number of test blocks taken to reach the analytic 
stage. High Anxious Ss tend to reach the analytic stage 
sooner than Low Anxious Ss. This is well illustrated in 
Figure ?• There was no significant interaction between 
levels of Dogmatism and levels of Anxiety.
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Referring to the effects of changing the pro­
gramme, (within subject differences) it appears as if Ss 
tended to reach a criterion of three or more correct res­
ponses in one test block significantly sooner in Part I 
compared to Part II (Pc.Ol). This is apparent on inspec­
tion of Figure 7» There was no significant interaction 
of Anxiety with programme change, nor was there any com­
bined interaction of Anxiety with Dogmatism with programme 
change.
However, it appears from Table 9 that the levels 
of Dogmatism had a significant (Pc.Ol) influence on per­
formance as a function of changing the programme. In or­
der to simplify this interaction, an analysis of variance 
for simple effects was computed. The summary of this 
analysis is presented in Table 10.
Inspection of Table 10 indicates that the dif­
ference between Part I and Part II in the number of test 
blocks to reach the analytic stage was significant ( Pc.03) 
at the High level of Dogmatism. High Dogmatism groups 
reached the analytic stage significantly sooner in Part 
II than in Part I.
Table 10 also indicates that in Part I the in­
fluence of Dogmatism levels on time taken to reach the 
analytic stage was significant at the .03 degree of con­
fidence. Individual comparisons reveal that the Medium 
Dogmatism Group took the longest time to reach the analytic
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stage. As illustrated in Figure 7» Low and High Dogmatism 
groups did not differ significantly in this measure.
Table 10
Analysis for Simple Effects of Dogmatism and Programme 
Change on the Number of Trials to Reach the Analytic Stage
(N=60)
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Squares
F Ratio
Pt for D^
(Part for Low Dog.) 1.40 1 1.40 .97
Pt for Dp 2.74 1 2 .74 1.90
Pt for Do 8.99 . 1 8.99 6.24**
Error 171 1.44
D for Pt,
(Dog. ror Part I) 11.04 2 3.37 4 .49**
D for Ptp 14.34 2 7.27
Pooled Error 171 1.24
HH:- Pc.Ol
P<.03
Perhaps the most important comparison to be 
made relevant to Hypothesis III is between Dogmatism le­
vels in Part II. It is in Part II that reaching the anal­
ytic stage implies a realization that the programme has 
been changed from Part I. Inspection of Table 10 reveals 
a significant (P<J.Ol) effect of the levels of Dogmatism on 
the number of test blocks needed to reach the analytic 
stage. Individual comparisons revealed that High Dogmatic
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Ss tended to realize that the programme had been changed signific­
antly earlier than either Medium or Low Dogmatic Ss. This is well 
illustrated in Figure 7.
The significance of the results concerning the analytic stage 
affects the interpretation of the within-and between-group differ­
ences in learning cited earlier in this chapter. The most important 
question to be raised is whether or not the measures presented in 
Table 5 are a true indication of learning or only a reflection of 
the number of test blocks taken to reach the analytic stage. The 
difference in performance between groups in Part II may not have 
arisen because one group of Ss learned more efficiently than another 
group, but because some Ss realized relatively earlier than others 
that the programme had been changed. These Ss would have had a 
longer time to improve their performance before the end of the 
experiment.
In order to control for differences in test blocks taken to 
reach the analytic stage, a measure was taken in learning after the 
analytic stage. The measure is as follows. The number of correct 
responses occurring in and after that test block defined as the 
analytic stage was totalled for each S. In order to make between- 
subject comparisons, for each S, this total was divided by the num­
ber of test blocks contributing to this total. The means for each 
group of this mean number of correct responses for each test block 
is presented in Table II. A summary of this measure for each level 
of Dogmatism and Anxiety is presented graphically in Figure 8. In 
order to test the statistical significance of the differences ind­
icated in Figure 8, a three-way analysis of variance for repeated 
measures and unequal cells was computed. The summary of this analysis 
is presented in Table 12.
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Figure 8. Learning after the Analytic 
Stage for the Three Levels of Dogmatism and Anxiety 
in Part I and II (N=6o).
Considering first the be tween-subject differences 
which combines for Part I and Part II, it appears as if 
the overall effect of the levels of Dogmatism on perform­
ance was not statistically significant. However, the 
overall effect of the levels of Dogmatism on performance 
was significant at the .03 degree of significance. In­
spection of the data indicated that the performance of the 
Medium Anxious Group was the highest for all levels of 
Anxiety. A Newraan-Keuls procedure with group means showed 
that High and Medium Anxious groups are significantly 
(pc.03) better "learners'* than the Low Anxious groups.
UNIVERSITY 0 Ï WKDSOS IBSâEY
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Table 12 also describes a significant overall 
interaction between Anxiety and Dogmatism. Simultaneously 
increasing Dogmatism and Anxiety levels improves 
performance.
Table 12
Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Performance 
Measures after the Analytic Stage (N=60)
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Squares
F Ratio
Between Subjects
D §'53 2 4.27 1.83
A 18.73 2 9.88 4 .28*%
DxA 23.24 4 3.81 2 .32**
Ss within groups 394.90 171 2.31
Within Ss
Pt 3.36 1 3 .36 3 .24**
DxPt 2.10 2 1.03 1.34
AxPt 3.37 2 2.69 3 .96**
AxDxPt 22.43 4 3.61 8.2 3"'
Ss within groups 116.61 171 .68
o 1 
Pc.03 
* PC. 10
In considering the effects of changing the pro­
gramme (within Ss), it appears as if the Ss generally 
learned better after the analytic stage in Part II than in 
Part I (Pc.o3). This is well illustrated in Figure 8.
Inspection of Table 12 does not reveal any
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significant interaction between leyels of Dogmatism and 
changing the programme. This is not the case for levels 
of Anxiety which showed an interaction at the .03 level of 
significance. Figure 8 illustrates the tendency for the 
difference in performance between Part I and Part II to 
increase, in the direction of better performance, with 
each increasing level of Anxiety. There was a significant 
(Pc.Ol) interaction of Anxiety with Dogmatism with pro­
gramme change. Changing the programme and simultaneously 
increasing Anxiety and Dogmatism levels appears to improve 
performance.
In order to "break down" these significant inter­
actions, an analysis of variance for simple effects was 
computed. The summary of this analysis is presented in 
Table 13» This table indicates (D at A, etc.) that, if 
Part I and Part II measures are combined, there is a sig­
nificant difference (Pc.03) between High and Low Dogmatic 
groups at the High and Low levels of Anxiety but not at the 
Medium level. The tendency is for performance to increase 
with Dogmatism, although, as Table 12 indicates, this ten­
dency is not statistically significant.
Inspection of Table 13 also reveals (A at D-^  
etc.) that High Anxious groups performed significantly 
better than Low Anxious groups at Low (P<. 10) and Medium 
(P<.03) levels of Dogmatism. The overall effect of 
Increasing Anxiety levels is to increase performance.
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Table I3
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects on 
Performance after the Analytic Stage (N=60)
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Squares
P Ratio
D at At (Dog. at Low
Anx.) 14.83 2 7.42 3 .21**
D at A2 .23 2 .12 .03
D at A^ 16.76 2 8.38 3.63*#
A at Dn (Anx. at Low
Dog.) 13.32 2 6.66 2.88*
A at Dp 28.27 2 14.14 6.12*-*ü
A at Do . .47 2 .24 .10
Error — 171 2.31
Pt at Dt (Part,at Low
Dog.) 3.62 1 3.62 3.32**
Pt at Dp 2.10 1 2.10 3.09*
Pt at D3 C.Ol 1 C.Ol C.Ol
Pt at At .11 1 .11 . 16
Pt at Ap .47 1 .47 .69
Pt at Ao 8.41 1 8.41 12.37'.."-“.-
Error - 171 .68
D at Pti (Dog. at
Part f) 8.29 2 4.13 2.86#
D at Ptp 2.34 2 1.17 .81
A at Pti 3.33 2 2.78 1.92
A at Ptp 18.37 2 9.29 6.41'"""""'
DA at Ptq 44.13 4 11.04 7 . 6l#iH>
DA at Ptp 1.38 4 .39 .27
Pooled Error 171 1.43
Pc.Ol 
** Pc.o3 
* PC. 10
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The data in Table 13 Indicate (Pt at etc.),
Ss in Low (P<!,03)> and Medium (Pc. 10) Dogmatism groups 
performed significantly better in Part II than in Part I. 
Figure 8 clearly demonstrates, that the difference in per­
formance between Parts I and II decreases with each increas­
ing level of Dogmatism until there was no significant dif­
ference at the High level of Dogmatism.
These findings were exactly the opposite for 
levels of Anxiety. Only the High Anxiety group (Pt at A3 ) 
showed significant (Pc.Ol) improvement when the programme 
was changed from Part I to Part II. Figure 8 illustrates 
this very well. There is an increasing improvement between 
Part I and Part II with each increase in Anxiety level.
Perhaps one of the most important findings rele­
vant to Hypotheses I and II comes with the consideration 
of the effects of Dogmatism on performance seperately for 
Part I (D for Pt^) and Part II (D for Pt2 ). The levels of 
Dogmatism had a significant (Pc.10) effect on performance 
in Part I with the High Dogmatism Group performing signifi­
cantly better than the Low Dogmatism Group. This is well 
illustrated in Figure 8. However, there was no significant 
effect of levels of Dogmatism on performance in Part II.
In Part II, High Dogmatic Ss did not differ significantly 
from Low Dogmatic Ss. This finding is also well illustra­
ted in Figure 8.
Again, the above-mentioned findings are exactly
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the reverse for the effects of Anxiety on performance in 
Part I (A at Pt^) and Part II (A at Pt2). High and Low 
Anxious Ss did not differ significantly in their perform­
ance in Part I. These observations are immediately rele­
vant to Hypotheses IV and V. Apparently, the increase in 
performance between Low and Medium Anxious Ss which is il­
lustrated in Figure 8 is not statistically significant. 
However, High Anxious Ss performed significantly (Pc.01) 
better than Low Anxious Ss in Part II as is illustrated 
in Figure 8.
From Table 13 it also appears that the inter­
action between Anxiety and Dogmatism was significant (Pc.Ol) 
in Part I (DA at Pt^) but not in Part II (DA at Pt£). For 
Part I, simultaneously increasing the levels of Anxiety 
and Dogmatism significantly increased performance. This 
was not the case in Part II.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION OP RESULTS
The results indicate that the selection of Ss 
to control for Anxiety was successfully accomplished. It 
appears as if conclusions concerning the effects of Dog­
matism and Anxiety can be made which are relatively inde­
pendent of Anxiety on the one hand and Dogmatism on the 
other. Unfortunately, the small pool of Ss available for 
sampling sivtraly restricted the selection so that there 
may not have been an adequate number of subjects for each 
group.
Before discussing the results, it is appropriate 
at this point to consider the empirical criterion imposed 
on the data and defined as the analytic stage. This cri­
terion set that test block at which the subject first 
gained three or more correct responses as a measure of the 
analytic stage. This first test block which contained 
three correct responses had to be followed by others con­
taining three to satisfy the criterion. Although this 
criterion was arbitrarily defined, the empirical stringency 
of its application to the data made it a useful measure.
Consider first its usefulness in Part I. Part I
60
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was a simple learning task with a minimum of potential 
interference from past learning. The analytic stage in 
Part I can be interpreted as an indication of a subject's 
general comprehension of the learning task. A subject who 
gives three or more correct responses relatively early in 
Part I must have understood the instructions. In addition, 
he must have become relatively familiar with the learning 
apparatus and the characteristics of its function.
However, the meaning of the analytic stage in 
Part I is somewhat different from its interpretation for 
Part II. It will be recalled that between Part I and II 
the programme was changed without notifying the subjects. 
The criterion set as the analytic stage in Part II was an 
attempt to measure, in number of test blocks, the time 
taken for subjects to perform as if they realized that the 
programme had been changed.
It will also be recalled that measurement of the 
analytic stage had an important effect on a learning mea­
sure employed in this study. Two measures of learning 
were taken. One was the total number of correct responses 
appearing in the nine test blocks of each of Part I and 
Part II. The second measure was the number of correct 
responses appearing in test blocks after the analytic stage. 
This second measure is very much determined by the arbi­
trary criterion set for the analytic stage. In order to 
clarify the possibility of experimenter bias, it is neces-
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aary to show how measures which are based on an arbitrary 
criterion compare to measures relatively free from this 
criterion. In the present study this problem can be formu­
lated as follows : Does taking a measure of performance
after the analytic stage seriously change the findings 
based on the first measure of performance? The results 
indicate that the post-analytic measure of performance does 
not seriously affect conclusions based on the first measure 
except in the case of the High Dogmatism Group in Part II. 
This is readily apparent when Figure 6 is compared to 
Figure 8. It can be seen that the figures are practically 
identical except for the High Dogmatism Group. This ob­
servation was replicated by comparing, the results of analy­
sis of variance for simple effects for both measures. The 
comparison reveals that only the Dogmatic groups were af­
fected by the change in measurement. In most cases this 
difference was in the direction of making tendencies which 
were evident with the first measurement statistically sig­
nificant with the second. In conclusion, it appears as if 
employing the number of correct responses after the analy­
tic stage is a relatively valid measure of learning. Fu­
ture references to learning will be to this measure.
It is appropriate at this point to discuss each 
one of the hypothesis in view of the results reported in 
Chapter III. It was hypothesized that, in a simple learn­
ing task (Part I), performance varies directly with Anxiety.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
This hypothesis was not supported by the results. Per­
formance tended to increase from the Low Anxiety level to 
the Medium Anxiety level but it dropped at the High Anxiety 
level. High anxious subjects failed to perform signifi­
cantly better than Low anxious subjects, despite the fact 
that they gave three or more correct responses (analytic 
stage) significantly sooner than did the Low Anxiety sub­
jects. Apparently, High anxious subjects in Part I, be­
cause of their high level of drive and need to achieve 
tended to master the learning apparatus and task at hand 
significantly sooner than did Low Anxiety subjects. Des­
pite this fact. High anxious subjects were not able to 
improve their performance relative to Low anxious subjects. 
The reasons for this failure will be discussed in conjunc­
tion with the results in Part II.
It was also hypothesized that, in a complex 
learning task (Part II), performance varies inversely with 
Anxiety. The results do not support this hypothesis. In 
this study the exact reverse occurred. High Anxiety groups 
performed significantly better than did Low Anxiety groups 
in Part II. The results also indicated that highly anxious 
subjects realized that the programme had been changed sig­
nificantly sooner than low anxious subjects. Perhaps this 
was because highly anxious people, with a high drive level, 
are more sensitive to changes in the environment. It can 
be hypothesized that highly anxious people are quick to
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realize changes In their environment and are able to uti­
lize the realization of change to perform relatively more 
efficiently.
It will be recalled that the hypotheses concern­
ing the effects of Anxiety in Part I and Part II arose out 
of a consideration of the theories of Spence, Taylor and 
the Yerkes-Dodson Law. The data of this investigation 
failed to support these hypotheses. This failure may be 
the result of an Inexact theory and/or a poor experimental 
me thod.
Spa neb's theoretical position concerning the ef­
fect of Anxiety on learning states that Anxiety functions 
as a drive which facilitates learning In a simple task, but 
Inhibits learning In a complex task. The difficulty for 
any experimenter attempting to assess the effects of An­
xiety on learning Is deciding operationally what Is meant 
by a "simple" and "complex" task. Spence suggests that a 
task which offers a number of Interfering response choices 
can be said to be "complex". In order to simulate such a 
condition this experiment employed a modified negative 
transfer paradigm, which. In Part II, was designed to pre­
sent a maximum amount of Interference. The results suggest 
that although pilot studies and personal reports Indicated 
that there was Interference from past learning. Part II 
failed to be "complex" enough to discriminate the predicted 
effects of Anxiety. Most subjects performed better In
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Part II than in Part I. Apparently there is a negative 
transfer of stimulus response connections, and a positive 
transfer of knowledge concerning machine operation and 
methods of learning. Subjects reported that In Part II 
they frequently pushed Part I response buttons but that In 
Part I they learned methods of learning (memorized pairs, 
geometric connections, etc.) which facilitated performance 
in Part II. It appears as If Part II failed to be a suf­
ficiently "complex" task.
If this was the case the results are. In many 
ways, consistent with the Spence-Taylor Interpretation of 
Anxiety as a drive. The fact that the performance of High 
Anxiety subjects only began to differ from that of the per­
formance of Low Anxiety subjects in Part I supports Spence's 
c o n te n t io n  t i i ie  d l i f f ’e re n c o  i n  p e r fo rm a n 00 r o tv a e n  h ig h
and low anxious Individuals is a function of the number of 
learning trials. Highly anxious people bring to each ex­
perimental session a number of response patterns, which, 
at the onset of a learning task. Interfere with learning. 
After several trials, subjects are able to abandon these 
patterns and only then does High Anxiety facilitate per­
formance. It Is possible that, in Part I, High Anxiety 
groups did not differ significantly from Low Anxiety groups 
because there were not enough trials to encourage this 
dIfference.
The application of Spence's theory to Part II
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would mean that highly anxious subjects bring to Part II 
relatively more Interfering responses from Part I. But 
the finding that only the High Anxiety Group Improved 
their performance significantly with the change of pro­
grammes Indicates that the High Anxiety Group also brought 
to Part II methods of learning (positive transfer) which 
outweighed the effects of response interference and faci­
litated performance. This fact, coupled with the Increased 
number of trials, may have caused the High Anxiety groups 
to perform significantly better than Low Anxiety groups.
In conclusion, this study Illustrates the need 
for better operational definitions of those tasks In which 
highly anxious people are said to perform significantly 
different from the low anxious person. One of the most 
Interesting findings Is not suggested by the theories of 
Spence and Taylor. The results Indicate that highly an­
xious people may bring to a learning task response pat­
terns, which, apart from interfering with performance, may 
facilitate It. The results also Indicate that highly an­
xious persons are relatively more sensitive to changes In 
their environment. With the above mentioned qualifications, 
this Investigation generally supports Spence’s position 
that. In a simple task, highly anxious persons perform sig­
nificantly better than do low anxious persons. This dif­
ference between high and low anxious persons was shown to 
be a function of the number of learning trials.
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It was hypothesized that in a new learning situ­
ation (Part I), performance varies inversely with Dogmatism. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed by the results. On the 
contrary, high dogmatic subjects performed significantly 
better In Part I (P<.10) than did low dogmatic subjects.
It was also hypothesized that, In a negative 
transfer situation (Part II) performance varies Inversely 
with Dogmatism. This hypothesis was not confirmed by the 
Initial statistical analysis of learning measures. Levels 
of Dogmatism had no significant effect on performance In 
. Part II. However, further Inspection of the results Indi­
cated that the change of programme had a definitive Impact 
on high dogmatic subjects.
One such indication of this effect Is the finding
that high dogmatic subjects, although they learned rela­
tively better than did low dogmatic subjects In Part I, 
did not learn significantly better In Part II. This Is 
well Illustrated In Figure 8. It Is apparent that chang­
ing the programme Inhibits the performance of dogmatic 
subjects.
Figure 8 and the analysis of variance for simple
effects (Table 13) indicate that for Low and Medium groups
of Dogmatism, performance Improved significantly with the 
change of programmes. This was not the case for the High 
Dogmatism Group whose performance did not Improve with the 
change of programmes. It was suggested earlier that all
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subjects bring to the onset of Part II interfering respon­
ses of Part I (negative transfer) along with facilitating 
knowledge on how the machine functions and the best ways 
of learning (positive transfer). The results Indicate 
that high dogmatic subjects are unable to utilize this 
positive transfer, possibly because of overwhelming Inter­
ference from Part I.
Another observation extremely relevant In as­
sessing the effects of the programme change on the per­
formance of high and low dogmatic subjects Involves the 
criterion defined as the analytic stage. It was hypothe­
sized that High and Low Dogmatism groups do not differ In 
time taken to reach the analytic stage, which. In this 
study was the time taken to realize that the programme had 
been changed. This hypothesis was not confirmed. High 
Dogmatism groups realized significantly earlier than did 
the Low Dogmatism Group. These results will be discussed 
initially as they relate to the learning measure.
This finding Implies that the performance of 
high dogmatic subjects in Part II did not differ from that 
of low dogmatic subjects, despite the fact that they reali­
zed relatively early that the programme had been changed. 
On the average, high dogmatic subjects had over 24 test and 
training trials more to Improve their performance than did 
low dogmatics. Although high dogmatic subjects realized 
earlier that the programme has been changed, it did not
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facilitate better performance. The above mentioned results 
all support the hypothesis that, in a negative transfer 
situation, performance varies inversely with Dogmatism.
The findings of this Investigation have serious 
implications for the concept of Dogmatism as it is formu­
lated by Rokeach. From the Doodlebug problem, Rokeach 
concluded that dogmatic individuals, because of their 
closed cognitive systems, are relatively poor "learners". 
The results of the present study indicate that this con­
clusion Is an unwarranted generalization. In Part I of 
this Investigation, high dogmatic subjects learned signi­
ficantly better than did low dogmatics. Consequently, 
Rokeach’s general hypothesis must be modified to Incorpor­
ate the present data. In a simple learning task which is 
relatively free from Interference from past learning It 
appears as If performance varies dIrectly with Dogmatism,
In a complex learning task In which there Is a maximum of 
potential interference from prior learning, performance 
varies Inversely with Dogmatism.
These hypothesis are not alien from the theore­
tical conceptualization of the dogmatic person described 
by Rokeach. Such individuals, because they are basically 
threatened by the environment, are relatively intolerant 
of ambiguity. Consequently their cognitive system Is 
oriented towards manipulating and organizing their percep­
tual field. Perhaps it is for this reason that highly
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dogmatic subjects perform relatively well on Part I of 
this study.
It is appropriate at this point to comment on a 
frequent criticism of "Authoritarian" questionnaires. Such 
questionnaires are often said to be a measure of acquies­
cence in response rather than of authoritarian personality. 
In this study. It Is difficult to conceive of an acquies­
cent Individual performing In a superior manner as did high 
dogmatic subjects in Part I.
The hypothesis that performance varies Inversely 
with Dogmatism In a negative transfer situation Is well 
explained by Rokeach's description of the dogmatic person. 
Individuals high In Dogmatism are extremely resistant to 
change and tend to rigidly employ response patterns which 
are often a result of past learning. Assuming that there 
was true negative transfer In Part II, this conceptualiza­
tion of the dogmatic personality explains the performance 
of High Dogmatism groups in Part II. Future studies should 
attempt to Investigate If dogmatic subjects actually do 
use old responses In a new learning task.
It will be recalled that there was a significant 
interaction between Anxiety and Dogmatism in Part I.
Rokeach claims that the closed mind is a defense against 
Anxiety. It follows, therefore, that holding Dogmatism 
constant, the effect of Increasing Anxiety would be to 
increase an individual's need to achieve organization of
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his environment. Increasing both Anxiety and Dogmatism 
would heighten the performance characteristic of this need 
to organize. The fact that there was no significant 
Interaction between Dogmatism and Anxiety In Part II fur­
ther supports the above-mentioned conclusion that the pro­
gramme change affected anxious and dogmatic subjects 
differently.
From experiments with the Doodlebug problem, 
Rokeach maintains that high and low dogmatic subjects do 
not differ In the time taken to reach the analytic stage. 
Using the criterion set In this Investigation, high dogma­
tic subjects reached the analytic stage significantly 
earlier than did low dogmatic subjects. The discrepancy 
of Rokeach’s position with the results of this study re­
flect the difference between Rokeach's Doodlebug problem 
and Part II of the present investigation. In the Doodlebug 
problem subjects were said to reach the analytic stage 
when they Indicated verbally that they had rejected three 
beliefs concerning the characteristics of bugs commonly 
found In nature. In the present study the analytic stage 
was that point at which subjects realized that the pro­
gramme had been changed. There is an Important difference 
between the two studies. In the present study, the experi­
menter controlled the learning apparatus and hence the 
paired associations to be learned and then changed. Conse­
quently it was possible for subjects to see the experimenter
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as a major determinant of his success at the task. This 
is not the case In the Doodlebug problem. It follows that 
subjects in the present study would have less trust in the 
integrity of the experimenter.
If this were the case, then perhaps high dogmatic 
subjects realized relatively early that the programme had 
been changed because they were more suspicious of the ex­
perimenter and his manipulation of the apparatus. This is 
consistent with Rokeach’s description of the dogmatic per­
son who is said to be somewhat distrustful and paranoid 
concerning people.
It will also be recalled that Rokeach states that 
the difference between persons high and low In Dogmatism 
can be found In synthetic ability. Low dogmatic Individuals 
are said to be superior in their ability to integrate new 
facts during the solution of a task. In many ways the syn­
thetic stage is analogous to learning which occurs after 
the analytic stage. Low dogmatic subjects do appear to be 
relatively superior in synthetic ability.
The correlations noted in Table 2 add a note of 
caution to the interpretation of the results. The low 
correlation between Dogmatism and Neuroticism or Extro­
version indicate that the conclusions made about the 
effects of Dogmatism on performance are relatively free, 
from confounding by Extroversion and Neuroticism. As the 
significant correlations between Anxiety and Extroversion
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and Neuroticism indicate, this is not the case for Anxiety. 
The interpretation of the generally superior performance 
of high anxious subjects does not have to be restricted to 
Spence’s formulations. It can be said that High Anxiety 
Groups performed relatively well because they are neurotic 
Introverts In which exaggerated cortical excitation facili­
tates learning.
It Is appropriate at this point to discuss the 
findings of this Investigation In the context of past and 
future "personality" research. The results of this study 
support the contention that meaningful results can be ob­
tained by comparing measures of experimental learning with 
scores on paper and pencil questionnaires. Questionnaires 
successfully discriminated relatively poor "learners" from 
those who learned relatively well. In most cases, differ­
ences In subject performance were In a direction which 
supported the construct validity of each questionnaire 
(TMAS and D Scale) .
Another general conclusion which can be made 
from the results of this study Is that Dogmatism Is a dis­
tinct variable which affects learning differently than the 
drive Anxiety. If, as the results indicate. Dogmatism in­
hibits learning In complex tasks, and. If Dogmatism Is a 
frequent correlate with Anxiety, It follows that future 
Investigations Into the effects of Anxiety on learning must 
control for the independent variable Dogmatism. Past ex-
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perlrnents which have demonstrated the Inhibiting effect of 
Anxiety on performance In complex tasks, may. In fact, be 
demonstrating the effect of Dogmatism. This investigation 
suggests that there are individual differences in a vari­
able which Is Independent from the drive Anxiety and that 
this variable affects the tendency to use old responses in 
new situations.
One of the most interesting conclusions can be 
drawn from the simple observation that levels of Dogmatism 
as determined by the D Scale, affect performance In a 
learning task. It will be recalled that the concept of 
Dogmatism formulated by Rokeach dealt with the Individual 
differences In resistance to change, authoritarianism and 
narrowed time perspective only In the context of indivi­
dual differences In the structure of belief systems. This 
Investigation suggests that a cognitive system, which is 
characteristically dogmatic, ramifies in learning tasks 
and not just in those studies dealing with belief systems. 
The results suggest that Dogmatism is a relatively perva­
sive cognitive variable which affects behavior In a broad 
number of situations.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study was an attempt to assess the possible 
effect of different levels of Anxiety and Dogmatism on 
non-verbal palred-assoclate learning In a negative trans­
fer paradigm. The theories of Spence and Rokeach suggest­
ed the following hypothesis :
I) In a new learning situation performance varies 
Inversely with Dogmatism.
II) In a negative transfer situation, performance 
varies Inversely with Dogmatism.
Ill) High and low dogmatic subjects do not differ in 
the time taken to reach the analytic stage.
IV) In a simple learning task performance varies 
directly with Anxiety.
V) In a complex learning task performance varies 
Inversely with Anxiety.
The Dogmatism Scale and the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale were used to measure Dogmatism and Anxiety 
respectively. Part I (A-B) of a negative transfer paradigm 
was described as a "simple" learning task. Part II (A-C) 
of the paradigm was described as a "complex" task. The
75
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time taken in Part II for a subject to realize that the 
stimulus response connections had been changed was set as 
a measure of the analytic stage. The criterion established 
to determine the time taken to reach the analytic stage in 
Part II was also applied to Part I and termed the analytic 
stage.
Initially 145 subjects were given the TMAS and D 
Scales during a scheduled first year psychology class.
From this sample 60 subjects were divided Into High, Medium 
and Low Dogmatism groups according to scores on the D 
Scale, Each Dogmatism group was divided into High, Medium 
and Low levels of Anxiety according to TMAS measures. The 
final results of subject selection was three levels of 
Dogmatism which did not significantly differ in the mean 
TMS measure and three levels of Anxiety which did not 
significantly differ in the mean D Scale measure. The aim 
of selecting subjects to meet this criterion was to "partial 
out" the separate effects of Dogmatism and Anxiety on 
learning.
In the experimental procedure subjects were re­
quired to learn paired associations between six white sti­
mulus lights and six response buttons. Subjects indicated 
their pairings by depressing the response button on the 
illumination of one of the white stimulus lights. A green 
light was employed to Indicate a correct response. Half 
way through the experimental session the reinforced white
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light-reaponse button pairs were changed without the 
knowledge of the subjects.
Using performance after the analytic stage as a 
measure of learning, an analysis of variance indicated 
that performance in Part I varies directly with Dogmatism 
(P<3,10), This was an exact reversal of Hypothesis I, This 
finding was discussed In terras of a dogmatic Individual’s 
Intolerance for ambiguity. A detailed analysis of the 
results generally supported Hypothesis II, A separate 
analysis of variance Indicated that high dogmatic subjects 
realized the programme change significantly earlier than 
low dogmatic subjects (P<,01). This finding is not in 
accord with Hypothesis III, It was suggested that high 
dogmatic subjects reached the analytic stage in this study 
relatively earlier because they are relatively more sus­
picious of change when the experimenter Is an integral 
determinant of their success at the task. Although between 
group differences were generally in the right direction, 
the data did not confirm Hypothesis IV, This failure was 
said to be a function of the limited number of learning 
trials given to subjects In Part I, Contrary to Hypothe­
sis V, performance In Part II varied directly with Anxiety 
(P<!,01), It was decided that Part II (A-C), although it 
encouraged Interference from Part I (A-B) was not "complex" 
enough to discriminate the inhibiting effects of Anxiety.
In conclusion, it was decided that this study
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illustrated the need for better operational definitions 
concerning those situations in which Anxiety and/or 
Dogmatism are said to affect performance. The findings of 
this investigation also suggest that Dogmatism is a relati­
vely Independent and pervasive variable which affects learn­
ing differently In "simpie" and "complex" tasks.
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APPENDIX A 
DOGMATISM SCALE
AGS SEX STREET
The following is a study of what the general public 
thinks and feels about a number of important social and 
personal questions. The best answer to the statements below 
is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many 
different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself 
agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing 
just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about 
others. Whether you agree or disagree with any statement, 
you can be sure many other people feel the same way you do.
Mark each statement in the left margin according 
to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every 
one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you 
feel in each case,
+1 I ApREE A LITTLE -1 I DISAGREE A LITTLE
*2 I AGREE PRETTY MUCH -2 I DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
♦3 I AGRB2 VERY MUCH 43 I DISAGREE VERY MUCH
1, A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is 
beneath contempt,
2, The main thing in life is for a person to want to do 
something important.
3, In a discussion, I often find'it necessary to repeat 
myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
4, Most people just don't know what's good for them.
5, In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if 
he considers his own happiness primarily.
6, A man who does not believe in some great cause has not 
really lived,
7, I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me 
how to solve my personal problems,
8, Of all the different philosophies which have existed in 
this world, there is probably only one which is correct,
9, It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause 
that his life becomes meaningful.
10, In this complicated world of ours, the only way we can
know what is going on is to rely upon leaders or experts 
who can be trusted.
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11, There are a number of persons I have come to hate because 
of things they stand for.
12, There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in,
13, It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
14, A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion 
among its own members cannot exist for long,
15, It is only natural that a person would have a much better 
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas
he opposes,
16, While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes 
have the ambition to become a great man, like Einstein, or 
Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
17, Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth­
while goal, it is unfortunately necessary at times to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
IS, If a man is to accomplish his m i s s i o n  in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all".
19, Most people just don't give a damn about others.
20, Any person who gets enthusiastic about a number of causes 
is likely to be a pretty wishy-washy sort of person.
21, To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous 
because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side,
22, If given the chance I would do something that would be of
great benefit to the world,
23, In times like these, it is often necessary to be more on 
guard against ideas put out by certain people or groups 
in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp,
24, In a heated discussion I usually become so absorbed in 
what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what 
others are saying.
25, Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I just can't 
stop,
26, There are two kinds of people in this world; those who 
arc on the side of truth, and those who are against it.
27, Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
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28, The United States and Russia have just about nothing in 
common.
29, In this history o£ mankind there have probably been just 
a handful of really great thinkers,
30, The highest form of government is a democracy and highest 
form of democracy is a government run by those who are 
most intelligent,
31, The present is all too often full of unhappiness; it is 
the future that counts,
32, Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed 
important social and moral problems don't really understand 
what is going on.
33, Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely 
place,
34, It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what's 
going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions 
of those one respects,
35, The worse crime a person can commit is to attack publicly 
the people who believe in the same thing he does.
36, In the long rin, the best way to live is to pick friends 
and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as 
one's own,
37, Most of the ideas that get published nowadays aren't 
worth the paper they are printed on.
38, It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of 
the future.
39, My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to 
admi t he is wrong,
40, When it comes to differences of opinion in religion, wo 
must be careful not to compromise with those who believe 
differently from the way we do.
1, Have you ever seen this questionnaire before?
2, Do you know what this questionnaire measures?___________
3. If your answer is Yes, please indicate what you think this 
questionnaire mea su re s'
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TAYLOR >IANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE
Place a T in front of those questions which you 
personally consider true of yourself, and an F in front of 
those questions which you personally think are false of 
yourself.
1,. I do not tire quickly.
2. I am often sick of my stomach.
3. I am about as nervous as other people.
4. I have very few headaches.
5. I work under a great deal of strain.
6. I cannot keep my mind on one thing.
7. I worry over business and money.
8. I frequently notice my hand shakes when I try 
to do something.
9. I blush as often as others,
10. I have diarrhea ("the runs") once a month or 
more.
11. I worry quite a bit over possible troubles.
12. I practically never blush.
13. I am often afraid that I am going to blush.
14. I have nightmares every few nights.
15. My hands and feet are usually warm enough.
16. I sweat very easily even on cool days.
17. When embarrassed I often break out in a sweat 
which is annoying.
18. I do not often notice my heart pounding and I 
am seldom short of breath.
19. I feel hungry almost all the time.
20. Often my bowels don't move for several days at 
a time.
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21, I have a great deal of stomach trouble.
22, At times I lose sleep over worry,
23, My sleep is restless and disturbed,
24, I often dream about things I don't like to 
tell other people,
25,• I am easily embarrassed,
26, My feelings are hurt easier than most people.
27, I often find myself worrying about something.
28, I wish I could be as happy as others,
29, I am usually calm and not easily upset,
30, I cry easi1y,
31, I feel anxious about something or someone almost 
all the time* /
32, I am happy most of the time.
33, It makes me nervous to have to wait.
34, At times I am so restless that I cannot sit in
a chair for very long.
35, Sometimes I become so excited that I find it
hard to get to sleep.
36, I have often felt that I faced so many difficulties 
I could not overcome them.
37, At times I have been worried beyond reason about 
something that really did not matter.
38, I do not have as many fears as my friends.
39, I have been afraid of things or people that I
know could not hurt me. .
40, I certainly feel useless at times,
41, I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.
42, I am more self-conscious than most people.
43, I am the kind of person who takes things hard.
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44, I am a very nervous person.
45, Life is often a strain for me,
46, I am not at all confident of myself.
47, At times I think I am no good at all.
48, At times I feel that I am going to crack up.
49, I don't like to face a difficulty or make an
important decisions,
50, I am very confident of myself.
INITIAL
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MAUDSLEY PERSONALITY INVENTORY
Instructions; Please answer each question by putting a 
circle round the "Yes" or the "No" following the question; 
if you simply cannot make up your mind, encircle the "?". 
Work quickly and do not ponder too long about the exact 
shade of meaning of each question. There are no right or 
wrong answers, and no trick questions.
Remember to answer each question.
1. Are you happiest when you get involved in Yes ? No
some project that calls for rapid action?
2. Do you sometimes feel happy, sometimes Yes ? No
depressed without any apparent reason?
3» Does your mind often wander while you are Yes ? No
trying to concentrate?
4. Do you usually take the initiative in Yes ? No
making new friends? '
5. Are you inclined to be quick and sure in Yes ? No
your actions?
6. Are you frequently "lost in thought" even Yes ? No
when supposed to be taking part in a 
conversation?
7. Are you sometimes bubbling over.with energy Yes ? No
and sometimes very sluggish?
8. Would you rate yourself as a lively Yes ? No
individual?
9. Would you be very unhappy if you were Yes ? No
prevented from making numerous social
contacts?
10, Are you inclined to be moody? Yes ? No
11, Do you have frequent ups and downs in mood, Yes ? No
either with or without apparent cause?
12,' Do you prefer action to planning for action? Yes ? No
13, Are your daydreams frequently about things Yes ? No
that can never come true?
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14, Are you inclined to keep in the background Yes ? No
on social occassions?
15, Are you inclined to ponder over your past? Yes ? No
16, Is it difficult to "lose yourself" even at a Yes ? No
lively party?
17, Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no good Yes ? No 
reason at.all?
18, Are you inclined to be overconscientious? Yes ? No
19, Do you often find that, you have made up your Yes ? No
mind too late?
20, Do you like to mix socially with people? Yes ? No
21, Have you often lost sleep over your worries? Yes ? No
22, Are you inclined to limit your acquaintances Yes ? No
) to a select few?
,
23, Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt? 'ibs ? No
24, Do you ever take your work as if it were a Yes ? No
matter of life or death?
25, Are your feelings rather easily hurt? Yes ? No
26, Do you like to have many social engagements? Yes ? No
27, Would you rate yourself as a tense or Yes ? No
"highly-strung" individual?
28, Do you generally prefer to take the lead.in Yes ? No
group activities?
29, Do you often experience periodsof loneliness? Yes ? No
30, Are you inclined to be shy in the presence of Yes ? No
the opposite sex?
31, Do you like to indulge in a reverie ■ Yes ? No
(daydreaming)?
32, Do you nearly always have a  "ready answer" Yes ? No
for remarks directed at you?
33, Do you spend much time in thinking over good Yes ? No
times you have had in the past?
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34, Would you rate yourself as a happy-go-lucky Yes ? No
indivi dual ?
35, Have you often felt listless and tired for Yes 7 No
no good reason?
36, Are you inclined to keep quiet when out in a Yes ? No
social group?
37, After a critical moment is over, do you Yes ? No
usually think of something you should have
done and failed to do so?
38, Can you usually let yourself go and have a Yes ? No
hilariously good time at a gay party?
39, Do ideas run through your head so that you Yes ? No
cannot sleep?
40, Do you like work that requires considerable Yes ? No
attention?
41, Have you ever been bothered by having a Yes ? No
useless thought come into your mind
repeatedly?
42, Are you inclined to take your work casually, Yes ? No
that is as a matter of course? ^
43, Are you touchy on various subjects? Yes ? No
44, Do other people regard you as a lively Yes ? No
individual?
45, Do you often feel disgruntled? Yes ? No
46, Would you rate yourself as a talkative ' Yes ? No 
individual?
47, Do you have periods of such great restlessness Yes ? No
that you cannot sit long in a chair?
48, Do you like to play pranks on others? Yes ? No.
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions for TMAS D Scale + MPI
1, You arc asked to complete the questionnaire which is now
being passed out. The purpose of this questionnaire is
to give .us, the graduate students in psychology, certain 
information which will aid us in our research,
2, The information which you will be asked to give will be
dealt with in a confidential manner. This information 
in no way affects your academic work or position in 
this university,
3, Work quickly, don't spend too much time over any 
question; we want your first reaction, not a long drawn- 
out thought process. The whole questionnaire should 
not take more than a few minutes. Be sure not to omit 
any questions.
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEARNING TASK
1, Please refer to the row of 6 white lights and underneath 
it, the row of six response buttons.
2, Each response button is electrically connected with a 
different white light.
3, Your task now is to learn the correct response button 
whi te-light connections,
4, When a white light comes on you are to indicate your 
choice by firmly depressing and releasing o n e  and o n l y  
one response button. Please respond to each white light.
5, When a green light comes on at the left 6f the panel it 
means that you have pushed the correct button.
6, For example, if white light #3 comes on and then you 
push response button #4 and a green light comes on, 
this indicates that white light #3 is connected to 
response button #4,
7, In. order to, show how the study will work I will now 
present a series of white lights, the correct responses 
to which are in a 1 to 1 relation. T^at is, when white 
light #3 comes on the correct button to push is #3, when 
#2 comes on push #2 etc.
(12 trials presented here)
I repeat, I did this only to show you how the panel 
works. You must learn entirely new associations when 
the experiment begins.
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8, There are alternating test and training phases in this
study. In the training phases you will receive a green
light every time you push a correct button. In the test 
phase you will receive no green light,
9, The test phases will begin after the buzzer has been
sounded once, the training phase will begin after the
buzzer has sounded twice,
10, Let us review that again, when you hear the buzzer sound
twice you will receive a green light every time you push
a correct response, - when you hear the buzzer sound 
once you will not get a green light,
11, Please respond to each white light with the button you 
think is connected to the white light,
12, Please push only one response button,
13, Please do not talk,
14, We will begin with a test phase and then go into a
training phase, where you will receive green lights,
15, Please begin when you hear the buzzer sound.
16, Are there any questions,
•Thank you.
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